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TO ATTACH OR NOT TO ATTACH:
THE CONTINUED CONFUSION REGARDING
SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE
INCORPORATION OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
Michael Longyear*
The Fourth Amendment mandates that a search warrant particularly
describe what is to be searched or seized. Courts have allowed officers to
use supporting documentation, such as affidavits and other attachments, to
define, but not expand, the limits of a search. However, the use of these
supporting documents creates a problem when the document is referenced
in the warrant but is not physically attached to the warrant. This Note
argues that the protection of the Fourth Amendment is not the warrant
itself, but the guarantee that a warrant, fully detailing the search to be
undertaken, has been approved by a neutral magistrate.
INTRODUCTION
In 2002, federal authorities uncovered the activities of William Hurwitz,
a doctor in northern Virginia who was prescribing high doses of opioids to
several of his patients.1 With help from cooperating witnesses-patients
who were arrested for dealing drugs prescribed by Hurwitz-the
government was able to obtain voice recordings of Hurwitz acknowledging
the fact that it was highly likely that his patients were dealing some of the
drugs in order to pay for the rest.2
With this evidence, the government prepared a warrant application that
included the sworn affidavit of Special Agent Fulton S. Lucas of the Drug
Enforcement Administration. The affidavit included information obtained
throughout the course of the investigation, including "evidence obtained
with the assistance of five of Hurwitz's patients."'3 Lucas also submitted
the standard federal warrant application form, which required a description
of the person or property to be seized. In that section, Lucas wrote, "See
Attachment A of Affidavit," referring to his sworn affidavit discussing the
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Daniel Richman for his invaluable insight and direction throughout the Note-writing process.
A special thanks to my wife, Danielle, and to my friends and family for their support and
patience.
1. United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 466-67 (4th Cir. 2006).
2. Id. at 467.
3. Id. at 469.
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evidence the government sought permission to seize. 4 The magistrate
granted the warrant application and also granted the government's motion
to seal the application and supporting affidavit finding that "revealing the
material sought to be sealed would jeopardize an ongoing criminal
investigation .... 5
The government executed the search warrant, entered Hurwitz's medical
office, and seized all of his patient files.6 When Hurwitz was handed the
warrant at the completion of the search, there was no list of what was to be
seized, since this description was included in an affidavit that was under
seal. 7 Only after the agents departed the premises with the patient files did
the government attach the application to the warrant and file it with the
court. Only then could Hurwitz examine the warrant and its supporting
documents to determine whether it was supported by probable cause and
not overly broad. Hurwitz was subjected to a search pursuant to a warrant
that did not list who was to be searched, what places were to be searched,
and which items were to be seized. So far as he could tell, the officers had
free reign to search whatever they wanted.
The above scenario highlights yet another nuanced problem in the long
history of the Fourth Amendment and more specifically the warrant
requirement. The Fourth Amendment mandates that "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized."'8 The Fourth Amendment was originally designed to ban only
the use of general warrants, and the remedy available to anyone who was
harmed as the result of a general warrant was the opportunity to sue for the
common law tort of trespass. 9  However, as Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has evolved, the Fourth Amendment is now read not only to
ban general warrants, but also to characterize searches without warrants as
presumptively unreasonable and to exclude evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. 10
As a result of this evolving jurisprudence, law enforcement has had to
strike a balance between respecting the Fourth Amendment rights of those
searched without forfeiting the necessary tools needed to conduct thorough
investigations. In helping to strike this balance, courts have recognized the
use of supporting documents-warrant applications or sworn affidavits-to
define, but not expand, the scope of the search warrant. I I  This
development, however, has resulted in many different standards, depending
on the jurisdiction, for determining whether or not the supporting
4. Id. This evidence included patient medical and billing files. The affidavit did not
identify any individual patient files. Id.
5. Id. at 469 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6. Id. at 469.
7. Id. at 469-70.
8. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
9. See infra Part I.A.2.
10. See infra Part l.B.2.
11. See infra Part 1.C.
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documents should be read together with the search warrant. 12 The spectrum
ranges from a strict requirement calling for both language of incorporation
on the face of the warrant and physical attachment of the supporting
document to the actual warrant, to a lenient standard requiring only
language of incorporation on the face of the warrant. 13
This seemingly minor technical issue, though, could result in the scenario
discussed above-law enforcement conducting a search with the description
of the contents sought to be seized under court seal, thereby depriving the
searchee of his constitutional right to have the warrant particularly describe
the things to be seized at the time of the seizure. Why is this issue so
important? Could not a person just wait until after the search, go to the
court house, and discover what was to be taken? These questions point to
the very distinction that is made in the various circuit court decisions. 14
Some courts take the position that the searchee has the constitutional
right-pursuant to the particularity requirement in the Fourth
Amendment-to see a list of what is to be seized.15 Other courts take the
position that a person's constitutional rights are protected by the neutral
magistrate who reviews and approves the search warrant. 16 Either way, this
is not just another chapter in the long history of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence; rather, this issue highlights the very reason the Fourth
Amendment was adopted-the guarantee against general warrants and the
limitation on an officer's ability to rifle through one's belongings. 17
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the many different standards
regarding this issue in its 2004 Groh v. Ramirez18 decision. However, the
Court abstained from requiring a definitive test to analyze the issue, and as
a result, this issue remains unsettled in the circuit courts and is subject to
different standards depending on how the various judges reconcile the use
of supporting documents to complement a search warrant with their own
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
This Note examines the use of supporting documents with search
warrants in light of both the original intent of the Fourth Amendment and
the evolving standards that now accompany Fourth Amendment analysis.
Part I traces the history of the Fourth Amendment-its drafting, its
evolution into what it is today, and how the various circuit courts have
analyzed the supporting documents issue.
Part II analyzes the continuing conflict among the various circuits even
after the Supreme Court's ruling in Groh. Part II.A discusses those circuits
that have aligned themselves with the Supreme Court's preference, while
Part II.B analyzes those circuits that have narrowly interpreted the Supreme
12. See infra Part I.D.
13. See infra Part 1.D.1.a.
14. See infra Part I.D.1.
15. See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part lI.B.
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. 540 U.S. 551 (2004).
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Court's decision and continue to take a pro-law enforcement/original intent
approach to the issue. Part III explains why courts should not require yet
another bright-line test, but rather should remain faithful to the original
intent of the Fourth Amendment and recognize the validity of the warrant-
even with supporting documents that do not accompany the warrant-so
long as a neutral magistrate has reviewed all of the documents.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
This part outlines the history and development of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence from the colonial experience to present day and how this
development has impacted the issue of supporting documents and the
search warrant. Part L.A explores the use of writs of assistance in colonial
America and how this practice inspired the framers to prohibit the use of
general warrants in the drafting of the Fourth Amendment. Part I.B traces
the development of the Fourth Amendment from a ban on general warrants
to (1) a prohibition of unreasonable searches, and (2) a means to exclude
illegally obtained evidence with the use of the judicially created
exclusionary rule. Part I.C briefly discusses the procedure for obtaining a
search warrant as well as the procedure for sealing accompanying
documents. Part I.D outlines the varying standards required by the U.S.
courts of appeals. Finally, Part I.E discusses the Supreme Court's decision
in Groh v. Ramirez.
A. The Impact of Writs ofAssistance and
the Drafting of the Fourth Amendment
This section summarizes some of the seminal cases that set the stage for
the drafting of the Fourth Amendment. Part I.A. 1 looks at the use of
general warrants in colonial America and analyzes the cases that triggered
the intense outrage of the colonists against the use of general warrants. Part
I.A.2 traces the drafting of the Fourth Amendment, including the different
forms the amendment took, with arguments for and against those versions,
the influences behind the drafts, and finally how the amendment ultimately
received approval.
1. The Writs of Assistance Cases
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 19
19. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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The framers of the Constitution, as well as many colonists at the time,
feared the use of general warrants and "believed that the only threat to the
right to be secure came from the possibility that too-loose warrants might
be used." '20
The fear of general warrants was spawned by the use of writs of
assistance by the Crown in colonial America. 2 1 In his book, The History
and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, Nelson B. Lasson outlined extensively the use of the writs and
how this in turn led to the warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment.
In colonial times, the writs authorized officers of the Crown to "search, at
their will, wherever they suspected uncustomed goods to be, and to break
open any receptacle or package falling under their suspecting eye."'22 Upon
the death of King George II, the writs expired, and before new writs were
issued, their validity was challenged. 23 In what came to be known as the
Writs of Assistance Case, James Otis, former advocate general of the
admiralty court, argued that the "Writ [was] against the fundamental
Principles of Law. - The Priviledge of House. A Man, who is quiet, is as
secure in his House, as a Prince in his Castle. .".. ,,24 Despite his passionate
argument-an argument that would later help frame the Fourth
Amendment-the court upheld the legality of the writ.25
Two important cases followed the Writs of Assistance Case: Wilkes v.
Wood26 and Entick v. Carrington.27 In Wilkes, the secretary of state, Lord
Halifax, issued a general warrant that ordered the arrest of Wilkes, a
pamphleteer who criticized the king's ministers and the seizure of his books
and papers.2 8 Wilkes successfully sued in a tort action and received a
20. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev.
547, 552 (1999).
21. Id. at 561.
22. Nelson B. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 54 (1937). Unlike other general warrants at the time, the writs of
assistance were a "continuous license and authority during the whole lifetime of the reigning
sovereign. The discretion delegated to the official was therefore practically absolute and
unlimited." Id.
23. M.H. Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case 144 (1978).
24. Id. at 317. Otis was asked to argue the case for the Crown, but instead renounced his
post and argued against the use of the writs. Id. at 316.
25. Davies, supra note 20, at 561.
26. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.).
27. (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P.).
28. William J. Stuntz, Warrant Clause, in The Heritage Guide to the Constitution 326,
327 (Edwin Meese et al. eds., 2005). John Wilkes was a member of Parliament who
published pamphlets called The North Briton. These pamphlets criticized both ministers of
the government as well as government policies. One pamphlet in particular, No. 45,
contained a bitter attack upon the king's speech. The government sought to apprehend the
responsible parties and issued a general warrant which ordered the officials "'to make strict
and diligent search for the authors, printers, and publishers of a seditious and treasonable
paper, entitled, The North Briton, No. 45 .... and them, or any of them, having found, to
apprehend and seize, together with their papers."' Lasson, supra note 22, at 43 (quoting the
Lord Halifax warrant).
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judgment of £5000.29 Entick was similar to Wilkes in that a warrant was
issued commanding the seizure of Entick and all of his papers due to his
critical view of the king.30 Like Wilkes, Entick sued the messengers who
carried out the general warrant. Entick was awarded £300 in his tort action
for trespass. 31
These cases, commonly referred to as the Wilkesite Cases, stirred great
outcry among the colonists against the use of general warrants. 32 Several
news reports seized on the general warrant issue, referring to it as "'a
Cause, that, in the highest degree, affected the most sacred and inviolate
Rights and Liberties of Englishmen.' 33 In probably one of the most
commonly cited speeches at the time, Lord Camden declared in Entick that
"[general] warrants . .. [were] illegal, oppressive, and unwarrantable," 34
and that "Englishmens houses may be now again considered as their castles,
and not so liable to be exposed to the wanton sport or resentment of the iron
hand of arbitrary power." 35 This overwhelming sentiment against the use
of general warrants was shared by James Madison, who would later draft
the Fourth Amendment.
2. Drafting of the Fourth Amendment
The above cases were clearly in the minds of the framers when they
drafted the Fourth Amendment. 36 The Fourth Amendment went through
several drafts before being adopted with the language as we know it.37
Most of the disagreement among the drafters had to do with the warrant
clause. As Lasson noted,
[T]he Amendment was a one-barrelled affair, directed apparently only to
the essentials of a valid warrant. The general principle of freedom from
unreasonable search and seizure seems to have been stated only by way of
premise, and the positive inhibition upon action by the Federal
29. Stuntz, supra note 28, at 327.
30. Id.
31. Phillip A. Hubbart, Making Sense of Search and Seizure Law: A Fourth
Amendment Handbook 45 (2005).
32. In fact, "Wilkes and Liberty" became a rallying cry of colonists. Lasson, supra note
22, at 45-46. The colonists embraced Wilkes as a hero who was on the forefront in the fight
against the use of general warrants. Hubbart, supra note 31, at 46 n.114. American
supporters of Wilkes's cause sent him various gifts and letters of encouragement while he
served his twenty-two-month prison term. Id. at 47.
33. Davies, supra note 20, at 563 n.22 (quoting a contemporary news report).
34. Id. at 563
35. Id. at 564 n.22 (quoting a contemporary news report).
36. See generally Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (Oct. 4,
1774), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/resolves.htm. "That the following
acts of parliament are infringements and violations of the rights of the colonists; ... The
several acts of Geo. IIl ... authorize the judges certificate to indemnify the prosecutor from
damages, that he might otherwise be liable to, requiring oppressive security from a claimant
of ships and goods seized, before he shall be allowed to defend his property, and are
subversive of American rights." Id.
37. Lasson, supra note 22, at 101. "[Tlhe House actually voted down a motion to make
it read as it does now." Id.
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Government limited consequently to the issuance of warrants without
probable cause, etc.38
Lasson concluded that the first clause of the Fourth Amendment gave a
broad reasonableness standard and that the second clause banned general
warrants. 39 Consequently, the adoption of this amendment secured the aim
of the framers: "ensuring the protection of person and house by prohibiting
legislative approval of general warrants." 40
Madison's first draft of the amendment was a single clause that read:
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their
papers, and their other property from all unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places
to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.
4 1
This single-clause format had the effect of simply banning general
warrants. Upon review by the House "Committee of Eleven," Madison's
one-clause submission was all but unchanged-the committee substituted
"effects" for "other property" 42 and removed "all" from "all unreasonable
searches." 4 3  After committee, some objections were made, notably by
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, who objected to the phrase "by warrants
issuing" and instead wanted the phrase to read "and no warrants shall
issue." 44  This objection was made in order to make the language
"sufficiently imperative." 4 5 As Thomas Davies concluded, "The final two-
clause format... and the fact that the resulting first clause ended by stating
that the right 'shall not be violated,' are mere by-products of a change that
was only intended to make the ban against issuance of general warrants
explicit."'46
In sum, the framers authored the Fourth Amendment as a direct response
to the abuses suffered by general warrants issued by the Crown. Davies
noted, "The Framers aimed the Fourth Amendment precisely at banning
Congress from authorizing use of general warrants ... [and] did not mean
38. Id. at 103.
39. Davies, supra note 20, at 568.
40. Id. at 590.
41. Id. at 697 (quoting James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution, in 12 The
Papers of James Madison 201 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979)).
42. Id. at 710.
43. Id. at 715. "Thus, the Committee members must have also understood the proposed
search and seizure language as a ban solely against legislative approval of general warrants."
Id. at 716.
44. Id. at 717-18. Scholars debate about whether the objection should be attributed to
Elbridge Gerry or to Egbert Benson. Nelson Lasson attributes the objection to Benson, and
the Congressional record cites Benson as the objector; however, most of the evidence
suggests that Gerry made the objection since Benson served on the Committee of Eleven and
would have most likely made the change while the draft was being reviewed by the
Committee. Id.
45. Id. at 720. Elbridge Gerry was from Massachusetts, the state where most of the writs
of assistance harms were committed.
46. Id. at 722.
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to create any broad reasonableness standard for assessing warrantless
searches and arrests."'47  Despite this intention to restrict the Fourth
Amendment to solely a ban on general warrants, the Supreme Court would
begin to read the amendment as a prohibition on both general warrants and
unreasonable searches.48
B. Evolution of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
This section analyzes the shift in the way the courts analyzed search and
seizure cases. Part I.B.1 looks at the incorporation of a reasonableness
standard in evaluating both searches conducted with a search warrant as
well as those conducted without a search warrant. As will be discussed
later, this change in the reading of the Fourth Amendment will affect the
analysis that courts will make in deciding whether or not having supporting
documents incorporated in a search warrant is reasonable.49 Part I.B.2
looks at the introduction and evolution of the exclusionary rule into Fourth
Amendment analysis, especially with regard to warrants and the good faith
exceptions to the exclusionary rule.
1. From Banning General Warrants to Focusing on Reasonableness
Several Supreme Court decisions from the late nineteenth century to the
present have transformed the Fourth Amendment from the simple ban on
general warrants that it was at its adoption to its current form, which covers
warrants, warrantless exceptions, and reasonable and unreasonable
searches.
In Boyd v. United States,50 Justice Joseph Bradley, through examination
of previous decisions and historical records, tried to determine "what was
meant by unreasonable searches and seizures." 51 This case was one of the
47. Id. at 724. "The silences of the text regarding warrantless intrusions and when
warrants were required or excused were not oversights or defects of drafting. Rather, in the
common-law context the Framers had no reason to expect that those topics could become
unsettled or controversial." Id. The Fourth Amendment, then, created a right espoused by
Charles Pratt Camden and James Otis in the Wilkesite Cases-a protection against general
warrants-and if this right was violated, the claimants would have a remedy in law of torts
for trespass. Hubbart, supra note 31, at 78-81.
48. Although pure general warrant cases are rare these days, a recent decision in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit shows that, despite all of the progress that has been
made regarding Fourth Amendment protections, general warrants are still an issue. In
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 473 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006), the Court
was faced with an issue regarding patient files in the Bay Area Laboratory Co-operative
(BALCO) drug investigation. Federal agents received a warrant to seize the patient files of
ten Major League Baseball players. Id. at 921. In performing the search, however, the
officers seized the directory, which listed all of BALCO's patients. Id. at 922-23. This
raised the question of whether or not this search warrant constituted a general warrant. The
Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine which files could be kept
and which files must be returned to the aggrieved parties. Id. at 943.
49. See infra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
50. 116U.S. 616(1886).
51. Id. at 627.
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first cases that attempted to apply the "original intent" of the Fourth
Amendment to the then current practice of police investigations. Quoting
Lord Camden from Entick v. Carrington, Bradley wrote,
By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so
minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without
my license, but he is liable to an action though the damage be nothing;
which is proved by every declaration in trespass where the defendant is
called upon to answer for bruising the grass and even treading upon the
soil. If he admits the fact, he is bound to show, by way of justification,
that some positive law has justified or excused him. The justification is
submitted to the judges, who are to look into the books, and see if such a
justification can be maintained by the text of the statute law, or by the
principles of the common law. If no such excuse can be found or
produced, the silence of the books is an authority, against the defendant,
and the plaintiff must have judgment. According to this reasoning, it is
now incumbent upon the defendants [police officers] to show the law by
which this seizure is warranted. If that cannot be done, it is a trespass.52
Bradley acknowledged that the search of one's home by a police officer
was a trespass and was excused only if the officer could prove that he had
authority to search the premises; otherwise, the officer had committed a
tort. Furthermore, the Court in Boyd intertwined the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments thereby holding that it was unconstitutional for a person to
turn over documents that could be incriminating. 53 Although not a modem
approach to the Fourth Amendment, Boyd "opened the way for later court
decisions to create modem doctrine ....
Weeks v. United States55 was one such decision, and in some
commentators' minds, it moved the Fourth Amendment from solely a ban
on general warrants to a "protection, especially in the home, against
discretionary police activity."'56 In Weeks, the defendant was charged with
using the mail to distribute lottery tickets. 57 The defendant was arrested
without an arrest warrant, and his house was searched and papers were
seized without a search warrant. 58 The Court held that,
[i]f letters and private documents can.., be seized [without a warrant]...
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure
52. Id.
53. See id. at 637.
54. Davies, supra note 20, at 729.
55. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
56. Robert M. Bloom, Searches Seizures, and Warrants: A Reference Guide to the
United States Constitution 13 (2003); see also Davies, supra note 20, at 730-31 ("Weeks
initiated the development of modem doctrine by reading the Fourth Amendment as a broad
protection of a right to be secure in one's house and papers rather than as a simple ban
against general warrants.").
57. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386.
58. Id.
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against such searches and seizures is of no value, and ... might as well be
stricken from the Constitution.
59
Not only did the Court in Weeks expand the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment to include a general protection of citizens from invasions by
police officers without warrants, but it also held that the remedy for such
"misconduct" was the exclusion of the evidence seized by the officers. 60
Nearly a decade after Weeks, the Court further departed from the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment in Carroll v. United States.6 1 In
Carroll, officers conducted a warrantless search of defendants' automobile
and seized alcohol. In this case, the Court announced that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such as are
unreasonable." 62 Since many of the previous cases dealt with searches and
seizures occurring in one's home, Chief Justice William Howard Taft held
that the "true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are
made upon probable cause . . . reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer... the search and seizure are valid. ' 63 This
shift in Fourth Amendment analysis-from a requirement of warrants in all
cases announced in Weeks to a reliance on the reasonableness of the officer
in Carroll-would open the door for modem courts (post-Warren Courts)
to "favor police power over the security of the citizen." 64 As Bloom has
noted, since Carroll, the "Court has continued to articulate its preference
for warrants through its words but not by its actual holdings. '65
2. The Exclusionary Rule and Its Effect on the Warrant Requirement
In early American history, "[c]olonial justice was a business of
amateurs. '66 The local sheriff headed law enforcement, and constables and
night watchmen were the equivalent of modem-day police.67 For the most
part, these men were "ordinary citizens." 68  Therefore, since these were
ordinary citizens and the act of searching literally constituted a trespass, the
lawful warrant would indemnify the officer from a civil lawsuit for
trespassing.69 Modem police forces did not begin to organize until around
59. Id. at 393. The Court further held that the intent of the Fourth Amendment was to
secure persons from unlawful invasions by officials acting under the color of government
sanction. Id. at 394.
60. Id. at 398.
61. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
62. Id. at 147.
63. Id. at 149.
64. Davies, supra note 20, at 733.
65. Bloom, supra note 56, at 13; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)
(holding that searches conducted without sanction by an impartial judge or magistrate are
"per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions").
66. Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 27 (1993).
67. Id. at 28.
68. Id.
69. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 779
(1994).
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the time of the Civil War. 70 Scholars have argued that this newly organized
force, unforeseen by the framers, required even more protections of
citizens' liberty rights. 7 1 As Carol Steiker observed,
The metamorphosis of the colonial constabulary and watch into the
recognizable precursors of modem-day law enforcement illustrates the
ways in which the invention of the police created new threats to liberty.
Our colonial forebears could not have predicted the sheer numbers of law
enforcement agents at work today, the breadth of their operational
mandate, or their pervasive authoritarian presence. They could not have
imagined that the informal structures of constabulary and watch would be
transformed into a bureaucracy isolated from and frequently beyond the
control of local communities. They had no experience with the kind of
institutionalized corruption or shocking brutality that are among the most
common complaints about law enforcement today.72
As a response to the changing situation, courts read the Fourth
Amendment as more than just requiring warrants and reasonable searches;
rather, the Fourth Amendment should deter police misconduct.
Consequently, courts have taken it upon themselves to respond to the
dilemma of police misconduct.
73
The Fourth Amendment does not call for the suppression of evidence
seized contrary to its provisions. As noted above, Weeks v. United States
was the first case to articulate the exclusionary rule, 74 which has been
recognized by subsequent decisions as "a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved."' 75 From 1914 to 1961, a series of decisions expanded the
exclusionary rule from a mere ban on the actions of federal officers to a
deterrent on the actions of local officers.
After Weeks, which held that the exclusionary rule applied only to federal
officers but that evidence seized by state officers and handed over to federal
officials still was admissible, 76 the Supreme Court held in Wolf v.
70. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
820, 833 (1994).
71. Id. Steiker argues that police "developed ... their own ... culture...." Id. Police
were in charge of both crime investigation and prevention. This newly formed entity,
increasing in size, "gave rise to concerns about abuses of that authority: who would police
the police?" Id. at 834. Administrative and legislative attempts at police reform proved
ineffectual. Id. at 835.
72. Id. at 837.
73. See Stanley C. Brubaker, The Misunderstood Fourth Amendment: The Originalist
Reading Is Better Both for Civil Liberties and for Fighting the War on Terror, Wkly.
Standard, Mar. 6, 2006, at 29. Brubaker argues that the Warren Court's reading of the
Fourth Amendment greatly distorted its original meaning. Instead of allowing the victim to
sue in a tort action, the only reprieve for the defendant was the exclusion of the illegally
seized evidence. See id.
74. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
75. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
76. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
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Colorado77 that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; however, since the
exclusionary rule was not based in the Constitution, it did not apply to the
states.78 In Elkins v. United States,79 the Court overruled its decision in
Weeks and held that evidence illegally seized by state officers could not be
used in a federal prosecution-thus increasing the reach of the exclusionary
rule. 80 Finally, in Mapp v. Ohio,81 the Supreme Court held that evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment could not be admitted in state
court.82
Despite the Court's active attempt to give sharper teeth to the Fourth
Amendment, the Court soon carved out a good faith exception when it came
to search warrants. In United States v. Leon, 83 faced with the issue of
whether or not to exclude evidence that was seized pursuant to a defective
warrant, the Court held that,
"[i]f the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police
conduct, [then] evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed
only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or
may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment."'84
Therefore, the Court held that when an officer has a good faith belief that
the warrant is valid, and this belief is objectively reasonable, the evidence
will not be suppressed if it is later found that the warrant was invalid.85
The "Court [in Leon] . . . identified four situations in which police
reliance on a warrant is not objectively reasonable" and, therefore, in which
the exclusionary rule should be applied. 86 For the purposes of this Note, the
focus will be on the situation "when the warrant was so facially deficient
that a reasonable officer could not have believed it to be valid. '87 As will
be discussed below, 88 an officer with a warrant that contains language that
77. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
78. Id. at 28.
79. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
80. Id. at 223-24.
81. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
82. Id. at 655-56.
83. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
84. Id. at 919 (quoting U.S. v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975)).
85. Id. at 920-23.
86. Article I.- Investigation and Police Practices, 35 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 3,
191 (2006). The first three situations fall outside the scope of this Note. They are
(1) when the magistrate issued the warrant in reliance on a deliberately or
recklessly false affidavit; (2) when the magistrate failed to act in a neutral and
detached manner; [and] (3) when the warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking
in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable ....
Id. at 191-93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. at 193; see Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 ("[A] warrant may be so facially deficient-i.e.,
in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized-that the
executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.").
88. See infra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
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is overly broad cannot have an objectively reasonable belief that the warrant
is facially valid.
C. The Search Warrant Process
This section outlines the steps that an officer takes to procure a warrant. 89
It also discusses the procedure of sealing documents that support a search
warrant, because this practice has a large impact on the incorporation of
these documents during the execution of the search warrant, as will be
discussed below.90
Aside from the "well-delineated exceptions," 91 in order for a search to be
valid, an officer must obtain a valid search warrant. Pursuant to Rule 41(c)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, once an officer has probable
cause, he or she must swear to an affidavit and apply for a search warrant. 92
89. While this section uses the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as a guideline, it
should be recognized that each state has its own rules of criminal procedure. As noted in
Wayne LaFave's treatise on criminal procedure,
Roughly half of the states have court rules of criminal procedure or statutory codes
of criminal procedure that borrow heavily from the Federal Rules. Only a handful
of these states have fairly complete replications, and even then, they typically fail
to pick up an amendment here or there or find need to add a special provision or
two dealing with a subject not covered by the Federal Rules. Most of the states in
the Federal Rules grouping have a criminal procedure law more loosely modeled
on the Federal Rules. They typically start with a set of provisions covering
basically the same general subjects as the Federal Rules, utilize the specific
standards of the Federal Rules for a majority of those subjects, adopt modifications
for a fair number, and then completely depart for a few others. Overall, they
incorporate many more basics of the Federal Rules than they reject, and that
incorporation encompasses a wide range of procedures, running from the initial
filing of the complaint to posttrial motions.
I Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 1.2(f), at 50-51 (2d ed. 1999) (citations
omitted). In fact, "[t]he federal system is responsible each year for less than 2% of the total
number of criminal prosecutions brought in the United States." Id. § 1.2(b), at 10.
The states with court rules modeled upon the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. States with statutory codes modeled upon the Federal Rules are
Kansas, Montana, and Utah.
Jerold Israel, Federal Criminal Procedure as a Model for the States, 543 Annals Am. Acad.
Pol. & Soc. Sci. 130, 138 n.18 (1996).
90. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
91. Exceptions include "(1) Investigatory detentions; (2) Search Incident to Valid Arrest;
(3) Plain View Doctrine; (4) Exigent Circumstances; (5) Consent Doctrine; (6) Vehicle
Searches; (7) Inventory Searches; (8) Border Searches; (9) Searches at Sea; (10)
Administrative Searches; (11) Special Needs Searches, like school drug testing; and (12)
Abandoned Property." Laurie L. Levenson, A Student's Guide to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 380 n. 15 (2003).
92. The affidavit must contain the following:
(1) the crime alleged to have been committed, (2) any facts demonstrating
probable cause that each element of the crime has been committed, (3) the
involvement of each person or place to be searched or seized in the commission of
the crime, (4) any reasons to believe that evidence of the crime will be located at
any place sought to be searched, and (5) the source of the affiant's information.
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The warrant can be issued by both federal magistrate judges and state court
judges.
According to Rule 4 1, to satisfy the particularity requirement, the warrant
must identify with specificity the place, person, or item to be searched or
seized.93 When describing the place to be searched, the application should
include the address and a description of the location to be searched.94 A
description of the persons to be searched should use the searchee's name or,
if not known, then a description of the searchee. 95 The warrant should
detail the items to be seized.96 A warrant may be invalidated if the officer
uses overbroad language to specify the items to be seized.97 Lastly, the
court has the authority to seal an affidavit in support of a warrant
application if the government satisfies its burden of showing the adverse
consequences to persons or an investigation by granting immediate access
to the affidavit.98
To seal an affidavit, the government must show that sealing the
document will protect the ongoing investigation.99 In Baltimore Sun Co. v.
Id. at 380-81.
93. Id. at 381-82.
94. See Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925) (upholding the validity of a
warrant so long as the description is specific enough "such that the officer with a search
warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended").
95. "[T]he individual must be described with such particularity that he may be identified
with reasonable certainty. The person's name will suffice, but a name is not essential if
certain other facts, such as location and physical description, are given." 2 LaFave, supra
note 89, § 3.4(f), at 134. See United States v. Ferrone, 438 F.2d 381, 389 (3d Cir. 1971)
(holding "that the physical description of appellant, coupled with the precise location at
which he could be found, was sufficient and the John Doe warrant was, therefore, valid").
96. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) ("The requirement that
warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under
them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.").
[T]he requirement of particularity is closely tied to the requirement of probable
cause to search, under which it must be probable (i) that the described items are
connected with criminal activity, and (ii) that they are to be found in the place
searched. The less precise the description of the things to be seized, the more
likely it will be that either or both of those probabilities has not been established.
2 LaFave, supra note 89, § 3.4(f), at 135.
97. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990 (1984) (holding that the
attachment of an affidavit could cure an otherwise overbroad description of items to be
seized in the actual search warrant).
98. See Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (acknowledging that
while citizens have a right to inspect judicial documents, this right is not absolute and can be
limited at the discretion of the trial court).
99. See David Horan, Breaking the Seal on White-Collar Criminal Search Warrant
Materials, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 317, 325 (2001). Many other reasons have been given by courts
to seal affidavits. See In re EyeCare Physicians of Am., 100 F.3d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that disclosure of the affidavit could affect secrecy of a convened grand jury);
Certain Interested Individuals v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 895 F.2d 460, 467 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding that search warrant affidavits implicate individuals in criminal conduct and could
"seriously damage their reputations and careers"); Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60,
64 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he affidavit may describe continuing investigations, disclose
information gleaned from wiretaps that have not yet been terminated, or reveal the identity
of informers whose lives would be endangered."); In re Search Warrant for Secretarial
Area-Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 574 (8th Cir. 1988) (including affidavit contains nature and
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Goetz,l00 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit outlined the
procedure to seal an affidavit. The government's "motion to seal all or part
of the papers is usually made when the government applies for the warrant,"
and the decision "to seal the papers must be made by the [magistrate]," who
"may explicitly adopt the facts that the government presents to justify
sealing when the evidence appears creditable."' 0'1 The magistrate may seal
the documents when it is "'essential to preserve higher values and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest."' 10 2  After a search has been
executed, pursuant to Rule 41(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the magistrate "must attach to the warrant a copy of the return,
of the inventory, and of all other related papers and must deliver them to the
clerk in the district where the property was seized." The affidavit then
becomes a judicial document whereby the target of the search has a
common law right of access to view the document.103
D. The Various Standards of Language of Incorporation
and Accompaniment of the Affidavit:
Confusion Among the Circuits Before Groh v. Ramirez
This section outlines the various approaches taken by the several circuits
when faced with the issue of deciding whether or not a search warrant,
although facially deficient due to the lack of particularity, is saved by the
incorporation of and attachment/accompaniment of supporting documents.
Part I.D.1 briefly outlines the several standards imposed by the circuits
when analyzing the issue. Part I.D.l.a through Part I.D.l.d take a closer
look at how the courts apply these standards to different facts and how
differing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence affects the outcome of a case.
scope of ongoing government investigation and "[t]here is a substantial probability that the
government's on-going investigation would be severely compromised if the sealed
documents were released"); In re Four Search Warrants, 945 F. Supp. 1563, 1568 (N.D. Ga.
1996) ("Release of the names of witnesses in the affidavits will lead to intense media
scrutiny that will harass present witnesses and deter future witnesses from coming
forward.").
100. 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989).
101. Id. at 65.
102. Id. at 65-66 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510
(1984)). The court noted that the magistrate should also consider alternatives to sealing the
entire document, e.g., producing a redacted version or disclosing some of the documents. Id.
at 66.
103. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(i); see Gardner v. Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1990)
(holding that, although "the fact that search warrants are commonly filed under seal until the
warrant is executed does not change their status as public documents," the decision to unseal
is subject to the discretion and careful review of the judge); see generally, Erica A. Kastnn,
The Expanding Right of Access: Does It Extend to Search Warrant Affidavits?, 58 Fordham
L. Rev. 655 (1990).
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1. Circuit Splits
While the traditional rule is that an affidavit cannot cure the generality of
a search warrant, 104 many state courts and federal courts have held that it is
possible for a facially deficient warrant-deficient due to lack of specificity
in describing persons or places to be searched-to be saved by a sufficient
description in the affidavit. 10 5 The first court of appeals decision on the
issue of curing an invalid search warrant was the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Moore v. United States,10 6 where the court
held that "the warrant may properly be construed with reference to an
affidavit for purposes of sustaining the particularity of the premises to be
searched, provided that (1) the affidavit accompanies the warrant, and...
(2) the warrant uses 'suitable words of reference' which incorporate the
affidavit by reference."' 1 7  Since this decision, most of the circuits have
ruled on the issue, with different standards prevailing. The Supreme Court
has discussed the issue, but has yet to put an end to the debate. 10 8
In his treatise on search and seizure law, Wayne R. LaFave has
categorized the many different standards that circuits use to cure a facially
invalid search warrant with a supporting document. 10 9 The standards are as
follows: (1) only language of incorporation is sufficient, (2) affidavit
available to the officers executing the warrant is sufficient, 110 (3) language
of incorporation and accompaniment is required, and (4) language of
incorporation and physical attachment is required. 111  Although the
104. See United States v. Gill, 623 F.2d 540, 543 (8th Cir. 1980) ("The traditional rule is
that the generality of a warrant cannot be cured by the specificity of the affidavit which
supports it because, due to the fundamental distinction between the two, the affidavit is
neither part of the warrant nor available for defining the scope of the warrant.... However,
where the affidavit is incorporated into the warrant, it has been held that the warrant may
properly be construed with reference to the affidavit for purposes of sustaining the
particularity of the premises to be searched .... ) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 541
F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir. 1978)).
105. See Larry EchoHawk & Paul EchoHawk, Curing a Search Warrant That Fails to
Particularly Describe the Place to Be Searched, 35 Idaho L. Rev. 1, 13 (1998) (tracing the
earliest state court recognition of saving an invalid search warrant with incorporated
documents to Dwinnels v. Boynton, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 310 (1862)).
106. 461 F.2d 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
107. Id. at 1238 (citing United States v. Snow, 9 F.2d 978, 979 (D. Mass. 1925)).
108. See infra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
109. Curing a search warrant means that the warrant becomes valid when taken together
with the supporting documents. While it still could be possible for a court to uphold the
validity of the search pursuant to the good faith exception in Leon, the following sections
discuss the circumstances in which courts did not have to decide on the good faith exception
since it was found that the search warrant was facially valid.
110. This requirement assumes that the officer executing the warrant is the officer who
applied for the warrant and therefore covers two other standards: (1) language of
incorporation, accompaniment, and the affiant executing the search, and (2) knowledge on
the part of the affiant executing the warrant as to what he was authorized to seize. In theory,
then, this category is a catchall that involves the affidavit being available at the scene and the
officer knowing what is contained in the affidavit when he or she executes the warrant.
111. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §
4.6(a), at 613-14 (4th ed. 2004); see also EchoHawk & EchoHawk, supra note 105, at 13-22.
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standards seem clear enough, as will be discussed below, several circuits
have found that their decisions fall into more than one category. One circuit
has established a bright-line rule, i.e. the warrant must include express
language of incorporation and physical attachment; however, many circuits
have resisted this strict standard, and have based their decisions instead on
whether or not the warrant and affidavit were used in a way that limited the
search so that it complied with the spirit of the Fourth Amendment.
a. Language of Incorporation
The most lenient of the standards requires only that the search warrant
refer to the supporting documents by some language of incorporation (e.g.,
"See Attachment A" or "See Exhibit A"). 112 Only a few courts have
adopted this lenient standard requiring only language of incorporation to
cure a facially deficient search warrant. Acknowledging that language of
incorporation and physical attachment would end the inquiry as to the
validity of the cure, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Jonesl 1 3  held that incorporation by reference
"suppl[ies] . . . the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment. 11 4
The court reasoned that requiring incorporation language and physical
attachment in every circumstance would produce an "artificial rigidity" in
this area and run counter to the purpose of the particularity requirement:
protection from general searches as well as recognition of the practical
needs of law enforcement.1 5 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit found in United
States v. Dale,1 6 a case involving tax fraud, that "the warrant was not
constitutionally infirm because it ... incorporated an affidavit to limit the
search .... ,117 In United States v. Washington,118 the Fourth Circuit gave
a slight variation on this rule when it held that "'[a]n affidavit may provide
the necessary particularity for a warrant if it is either incorporated into or
The EchoHawk article divides the various standards differently, labeling them (1)
incorporation by reference and physical attachment, (2) incorporation by reference and
affidavit accompanies the search warrant, (3) either incorporation by reference or
attachment, (4) incorporation and equivalent of accompany, and (5) functional equivalent
approach. EchoHawk & EchoHawk, supra note 105, at 13-18.
112. For a discussion on suitable language of incorporation, see United States v.
Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Although there is little case law
specifically addressing what suffices to incorporate an affidavit into a warrant by reference,
we believe that something more is required than a boilerplate statement that the affidavit or
affidavits presented to the magistrate constitute probable cause for issuing the warrant....
[T]he express incorporation rule... [requires] the magistrate to manifest an explicit
intention to incorporate an affidavit." (citations omitted)).
113. 54 F.3d 1285 (7th Cir. 1995).
114. Id. at 1290.
115. Id. at 1291.
116. 991 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
117. Id. at 848. The court also noted the importance of the fact that the warrant was
"executed by the affiant pursuant to a specific plan." Id. The court, however, did not find
that this aspect was necessary in order to cure the search warrant. Id.
118. 852 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1988).
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attached to the warrant."'' 1 1 9 It also should be noted that many state courts
have referenced circuit court holdings when faced with the incorporation
issue. 120
b. Availability of the Affidavit
Other courts have based their decisions on policy grounds-that the spirit
of the Fourth Amendment is followed so long as the officers conducting the
search know the limits of the search. In United States v. Bianco,1 2 1 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that
[w]arrants must be read in a 'commonsense' fashion, and... should not
adhere to formal requirements of incorporation and attachment where as
here, [where there was no language of incorporation or physical
attachment] it is clear that the involved parties were aware of the scope of
and limitations on the search.
12 2
Much like in Jones, the court took a more practical approach and
determined that, so long as the officer knew the limits of the search, the
Fourth Amendment would not be violated. The court in Bianco found that
"because of the presence at the search of the affidavit, [the agent's] active
supervision of the search, the specificity of the affidavit, and the fact that
the agents did not exceed the scope of the warrant and affidavit when read
together,.. . the search was reasonable." 123
119. Id. at 805 (quoting Rickert v. Sweeney, 813 F.2d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 1987)).
120. Although a majority of criminal prosecutions are conducted in state courts, it appears
that, for the most part, state courts have deferred to the circuit courts when ruling on the
incorporation issue. See State v. Holland, 781 S.W.2d 808, 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)
("[S]ufficient particularity to validate a warrant inadequately limited upon its face may be
supplied by the attachment or incorporation by reference of the application for the warrant
and the supporting affidavits."); State v. Kleinberg, 421 N.W.2d 450, 453-54 (Neb. 1988)
("An affidavit may provide the necessary particularity for a warrant if it is either
incorporated into or attached to the warrant.... Sufficient particularity may also be provided
even if the affidavit is merely present at the search." (quoting Rickert, 813 F.2d at 909));
State v. Jost, 858 P.2d 881, 884 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) ("The warrant incorporated the
description in the affidavit by reference."); State v. South, 932 P.2d 622, 625-26 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that a sufficiently incorporated affidavit cures a facially deficient search
warrant as long as the search was confined to areas listed in the affidavit and the magistrate
reviewed both the warrant and the affidavit).
121. 998 F.2d 1112 (2d Cir. 1993).
122. Id. at 1117 (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)) (citations
omitted). In Ventresca, the U.S. Supreme Court did not invalidate a search warrant and held
that "affidavits for search warrants ... must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and
courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by nonlawyers in
the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requirements of elaborate
specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area.
A... negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police
officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting." Ventresca, 380
U.S. at 108.
123. Bianco, 998 F.2d at 1117. Therefore, since the warrant was considered valid, the
court did not have to discuss the good faith exception allowed in Leon. Id.
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In United States v. Wuagneux,124 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit noted its preference of having both language of
incorporation and attachment, but similar to the decisions discussed above,
the court acknowledged that the limit on general searches would be served
so long as the affidavit was present at the search site. 125 Lastly, in probably
one of the more lenient decisions, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in United States v. Gahagan126 reasoned that, even though the
warrant did not use language of incorporation (the affidavit was cross-
referenced) and the affidavit was in the officer's car instead of being
immediately at the scene, the search was valid as long as it was confined to
the areas described in the affidavit. 127  This approach, which one
commentator calls the "functional equivalence approach,"' 128 has been used
in many different state courts as well. 
129
124. 683 F.2d 1343 (llth Cir. 1982).
125. Id. at 1351 n.6. Wuagneux has been referenced by other circuits to validate searches
where the affidavit was only present at the scene. See, e.g., United States v. Tagbering, 985
F.2d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that "[a]n affidavit may provide the necessary
particularity for a warrant if it is either incorporated into or attached to the warrant... [or] is
merely present at the search" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. 865 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1989).
127. Id. at 1497-99.
128. See EchoHawk & EchoHawk, supra note 105, at 20.
129. See People v. Staton, 924 P.2d 127, 132 (Colo. 1996) ("[A]n affidavit can be used to
satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement if (1) a deficient warrant
incorporates a curative affidavit by reference, (2) both documents are presented to the
issuing magistrate or judge, and (3) the curative affidavit accompanies the warrant during the
execution of the search warrant. Further,... we hold that the execution of the search
warrant under the supervision and control of the officer who is the affiant obviates the
necessity for the affidavit to accompany the warrant when it is executed."); State v.
Matsunaga, 920 P.2d 376, 380 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) ("'It is enough if the description is such
that the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the
place intended."' (quoting Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925))); People v.
Fragoso, 386 N.E.2d 409, 413 (111. Ct. App. 1979) ("Reference to this document as a factor
in determining the validity of a search warrant is clearly permissible where the affidavit is
attached to the warrant, incorporated by reference, or as is the case here, where the officer
who signed and swore to the affidavit also executed the search warrant." (footnote omitted));
State v. LeFort, 806 P.2d 986, 992 (Kan. 1991) ("When the officer executing the search
warrant is the affiant who described the property to be searched, and the judge finds there
was probable cause to search the property described by the affiant and the search is confined
to the area which the affiant described in the affidavit, the search does not affect the
substantial rights of the accused and is in compliance with the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States and Section Fifteen of the Kansas Bill of Rights.");
Daffinrud v. State, 647 P.2d 443, 445 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) ("[l]n cases where the
executing officer has prior knowledge of the location to be searched, a minor
inconsistency.., does not invalidate [the warrant]." (citation omitted)); State v. Smith, 344
N.W.2d 505, 508 (S.D. 1984) ("[A] search warrant must particularly describe the place to be
searched, but that requirement is satisfied if the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the warrant are such that the officer can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended to be searched." (citation omitted)).
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c. Language of Incorporation and Accompaniment
Although appearing to be strict, the incorporation plus accompaniment
standard gives some leeway to officers who do not physically attach the
affidavit to the warrant itself, thereby forming one document. In United
States v. Morris,130 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found
that "[a]n affidavit may be referred to for purposes of providing
particularity if the affidavit accompanies the warrant, and the warrant uses
suitable words of reference which incorporate the affidavit."'13 1 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Beaumont,132
expressly declined to create a "technical, bright-line rule of [the] Fourth
Amendment" and instead held that
the better rule ... is to require that the warrant contain, at the very least, a
cursory reference to the affidavit upon which an executing officer may
have to rely .... [W]here a warrant contains only the barest of generalized
statements the particularity requirement is satisfied by reliance on an
affidavit when the affidavit is incorporated by reference into the
warrant. 133
This incorporation plus accompaniment standard has also been invoked
by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third,134 Eighth, 135 and D.C.
Circuits 136 when faced with this issue. The D.C. Circuit's opinion
referenced here differs slightly from that of Dale. 137 This discrepancy most
likely shows that "the court did not intend for the term 'accompany' to
mean attachment."' 138 This incorporation plus accompaniment approach is
also a favorite among the many state courts that have had to rule on this
issue. 139
130. 977 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1992).
131. Id. at 681 n.3.
132. 972 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1992).
133. Id. at 561.
134. See United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir. 1982) ("When a warrant is
accompanied by an affidavit that is incorporated by reference, the affidavit may be used in
construing the scope of the warrant.").
135. See United States v. Curry, 911 F.2d 72, 77 (8th Cir. 1990) ("[A] description in the
supporting affidavit can supply the requisite particularity if a) the affidavit accompanies the
warrant, and b) the warrant uses suitable words of reference which incorporate the affidavit
therein." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 77 n.4 ("[T]he affidavit
must both accompany the warrant and be incorporated into it.").
136. See United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("[A] search
warrant may be construed with reference to the affidavit supporting it for purposes of
satisfying the particularity requirement... only if (1) the affidavit accompanies the warrant,
and in addition (2) the warrant uses suitable words of reference which incorporate the
affidavit by reference." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
137. See supra note 116-17 and accompanying text.
138. EchoHawk & EchoHawk, supra note 105, at 16 (footnote omitted).
139. See State v. Moorman, 744 P.2d 679, 684 (Ariz. 1987) ("For an affidavit to save a
defective warrant, it must appear at a minimum that the executing officer had the affidavit
with him and referred to it ...."); Battle v. State, 620 S.E.2d 506, 508 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)
("[A] warrant that fails to meet the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement may be
cured by supporting documents if, in addition to being incorporated into the warrant through
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d. Language of Incorporation and Physical Attachment
The strictest standard imposed by the courts is the language of
incorporation plus physical attachment. To date, only one circuit, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, has imposed this rule; 14 0 however,
many state courts have adopted it as well. 14 1 In United States v. Leary,142
the Tenth Circuit instituted its "one document" approach when it ruled that
the use of appropriate language, the documents are either attached to or accompany the
warrant."); State v. Christow, 371 A.2d 108, 109 n.l (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) ("The
fact that an affidavit is sufficiently explicit does not validate an otherwise invalid warrant
unless the affidavit accompanies the warrant and is incorporated in the warrant by suitable
words of reference." (citations omitted)); see People v. Bennett, 653 N.Y.S.2d 835, 838
(Sup. Ct. 1996) (recognizing the incorporation and attachment test, but potentially permitting
accompaniment); Ashcraft v. State, 934 S.W.2d 727, 735 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) ("A warrant
that does not contain the place to be searched, the items to be seized, or the person alleged to
be in charge of the premises is not invalid provided that the warrant incorporates by
reference a sufficiently specific affidavit to support it[,]" and "[t]he failure to physically
attach the affidavit to the warrant is not a violation of the search warrant statutes [so long as]
a written inventory be served upon the owner of the premises to be searched." (citations
omitted)); State v. Jarrells, No. 32009-6-11, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 612, at *9 n.17 (Wash.
Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2005) ("'[T]he affidavit accompanies the warrant, and.., the warrant uses
suitable words of reference which incorporate the affidavit therein."' (quoting United States
v. Property Belonging to Talk of the Town Bookstore, Inc., 644 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir.
1981))).
140. The Ninth Circuit appears to be moving in this direction. However, the Court still
allows incorporation plus accompaniment. See United States v. Bridges, 344 F.3d 1010,
1018 (9th Cir. 2003) ("An affidavit providing more guidance than an overbroad warrant may
cure the warrant's overbreadth only if (1) the warrant expressly incorporated the affidavit by
reference and (2) the affidavit either is attached physically to the warrant or at least
accompanies the warrant while agents execute the search." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
141. See Sadie v. State, 488 So. 2d 1368, 1373 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) ("[T]he deficiency
of the warrant's description can be cured by (1) reference to the warrant's supporting
affidavit, and (2) such affidavit is attached to the warrant at the time of its execution and
incorporated by reference in the warrant."); Namen v. State, 665 P.2d 557, 564 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1983) ("[I]ncorporation of an extrinsic document must be formally reflected in the
warrant; the warrant must, on its face, refer to the extrinsic document that it purports to
incorporate, and the intent to incorporate the document must be stated. In addition, a copy of
the document incorporated normally must be attached to the warrant, or, at the very least, the
warrant must direct that the extrinsic document accompany it at the time of execution."
(citations omitted)); People v. MacAvoy, 209 Cal. Rptr. 34, 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("An
affidavit which meets these two requirements may be considered to remedy a warrant that
does not on its face meet the demands of particularity. Without imposing hypertechnical or
otherwise undue constraints on law enforcement, this rule operates in a common sense and
realistic fashion to advance the vital purpose of the particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment-the prevention of general exploratory searches which unreasonably interfere
with a person's right to privacy."); State v. Santiago, 513 A.2d 710, 717 (Conn. App. Ct.
1986) ("'In determining whether the description given the executing officer was sufficiently
detailed, it is of course important initially to examine the description which appears in the
warrant itself. If that description is inadequate, however, it is appropriate to look to the
description appearing in the warrant application or affidavit if it is clear that the executing
officers were in a position to be aided by these documents, as where they were attached to
the warrant at the time of execution and incorporated therein by reference."' (quoting
LaFave, supra note 111, § 4.5, at 73-74) (emphasis omitted)); State v. Kingston, 617 So. 2d
414, 415 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) ("[A]n affidavit will cure a defective search warrant if:
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the particularity of an affidavit may cure an overbroad warrant, but only
"where the affidavit and the search warrant... can be reasonably said to
constitute one document. Two requirements must be satisfied to reach
this result: first, the affidavit and search warrant must be physically
connected so that they constitute one document; and second, the search
warrant must expressly refer to the affidavit and incorporate it by
reference using suitable words of reference." 143
Relying on Leary, the Tenth Circuit stressed the importance of
incorporation and physical attachment in United States v. Dahlman,144
which was decided five years later.
E. The Supreme Court Speaks, but Not Really
This section analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Groh v.
Ramirez.14 5  The section discusses both the majority and dissenting
opinions. This decision has set the stage for the ongoing conflict
surrounding this issue, which will be discussed below in Part II.
In 2004, the Supreme Court addressed the particularity requirement issue
in Groh v. Ramirez. In Groh, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms was informed that respondent, Ramirez, had a large arms cache at
his ranch. 146 Based on that information, petitioner, Special Agent Jeff
Groh, signed an application for a search warrant stating that "the search was
for any automatic firearms or parts to automatic weapons, destructive
devices to include but not limited to grenades, grenade launchers, rocket
(1) The affidavit and search warrant are physically connected so that they may be considered
one document; and (2) the affidavit is expressly incorporated into the warrant." (citation
omitted)); Couser v. State, 374 A.2d 399, 404 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) ("[T]he affidavit
was specifically incorporated by reference and became part of the application in regard to the
persons, premises and vehicle to be searched."); State v. Balduc, 514 N.W.2d 607, 610
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) ("[A]n affidavit may be used to cure a deficient warrant if the
affidavit and warrant are physically attached to one another and the warrant refers to the
affidavit and incorporates it by reference." (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v.
Komegay, 326 S.E.2d 881, 894 (N.C. 1985) ("It is not necessary that the warrants use the
magic words 'incorporated by reference' in order to make the attached application a part of
the warrants. The clear import of the language used in the warrants is that the attached
applications are part of the warrants."); State v. Schmitz, 474 N.W.2d 249, 253 (N.D. 1991)
("[T]he generality of a warrant cannot be cured by the specificity of the affidavit unless the
affidavit is physically connected to the warrant, and the warrant specifically refers to and
incorporates the affidavit."); Commonwealth v. Bagley, 596 A.2d 811, 824 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) ("[S]uppression will not be required where an adequate description is contained in the
affidavit of probable cause and the affidavit has been incorporated by reference and is
attached to the warrant."); State v. Mack, 188 S.W.3d 164, 171 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004)
("[T]he presumption is that an affidavit is not part of a search warrant, even if the two
documents are served together, or are both found on the same sheet of paper. If, however,
there is explicit reference to the affidavit in the search warrant, the affidavit may be
considered part of the warrant." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
142. 846 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1988).
143. Id. at 603 (quoting LaFave, supra note 111, § 4.6(a), at 241).
144. 13 F.3d 1391, 1395 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Leary, 846 F.2d at 603).
145. 540 U.S. 551 (2004).
146. Id. at 554.
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launchers, and any and all receipts pertaining to the purchase or
manufacture of automatic weapons or explosive devices or launchers."' 47
Groh also signed an affidavit, which stated the basis for his belief that the
items were on the ranch. 148
The warrant was signed by a magistrate; however, the warrant itself did
not identify any of the items that Groh intended to seize-it only listed a
description of Ramirez's house. 149 The warrant also failed to include any
language of incorporation referencing the affidavit or warrant
application.15 0
The warrant was executed, and upon completion of the search, the
officers gave Ramirez's wife a copy of the warrant; however, they did not
give her a copy of the warrant application because it had been sealed. 151
Ramirez sued Groh and other officers raising eight claims, 152 including
violation of his Fourth Amendment right-specifically, he cited the failure
of the warrant to particularly describe the persons or things to be seized. 153
In its decision, the Supreme Court recognized the fact that an
"application [that] adequately described the 'things to be seized' does not
save [a] warrant from its facial invalidity."' 154 However, the Court also
acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a warrant from
cross-referencing outside documents. 55 The Court accepted the fact that
"most Courts of Appeals have held that a court may construe a warrant with
reference to a supporting application or affidavit if the warrant uses
appropriate words of incorporation, and if the supporting document
accompanies the warrant." 156  However, the Court found no need to
establish a bright-line rule. Since the warrant in this case neither had
language of incorporation, nor was accompanied by the warrant application
147. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 554-55.
151. Id. at 555.
152. Ramirez sued under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). In Bivens, the petitioner brought suit in federal district
court claiming that he suffered great humiliation and mental suffering as a result of the
federal agents' unlawful, warrantless search. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389-90. Petitioner sought
$15,000 in damages from each of the federal agents. Id. at 390. In this case, the Court held
that "the Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal power...
[and] guarantees to citizens ... the absolute right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority." Id. at 392. The Court allowed petitioner
to pursue his claim of damages reasoning that "where legal rights have been invaded, and a
federal statute [here, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)] provides for a general right to sue for such
invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done." Id. at
396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
153. Groh, 540 U.S. at 556.
154. Id. at 557.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 557-58.
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or the affidavit, the Court decided that it "need not further explore the
matter of incorporation." 157
Going beyond that actual incorporation/accompaniment issue, the Court
further rejected Groh's argument that "a search conducted pursuant to a
warrant lacking particularity should be exempt from the presumption of
unreasonableness if the goals served by the particularity requirement are
otherwise satisfied."' 58 Here, the Court ruled that, unless the items seized
were set forth in the warrant, it would be unreasonable to presume that the
magistrate "agreed that the scope of the search should be as broad as the
affiant's request."' 5 9 Finally, the Court rejected the exception noted above
that the warrant could be cured if the affiant was the officer who executed
the search. 160 The Court held that this exception was not valid in this case
"[b]ecause petitioner did not have in his possession a warrant particularly
describing the things he intended to seize .... ,,161
Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissented
from the majority, refusing to treat the search as a warrantless one. Thomas
acknowledged the confusion regarding the "[Fourth] Amendment's history,
which is clear as to the Amendment's principal target (general warrants),
but not as clear with respect to when warrants were required, if ever." 162
Due to the lack of guidance from the history of the Fourth Amendment,
Thomas noted that the Court has "vacillated between imposing a categorical
warrant requirement and applying a general reasonableness standard," and
came to the conclusion, after reviewing a history of Supreme Court
decisions, that the "cases stand for the illuminating proposition that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, except, of course, when they
are not."'1
63
In this case, Thomas recognized that the principal protection of the
warrant requirement was that it "interposed a magistrate between the citizen
and the police.., so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade
[the searchee's] privacy in order to enforce the law."'164 Therefore, the
contents of the warrant are "simply manifestations of this protection," so
that when a magistrate reviews both the warrant and warrant application, "a
searchee still has the benefit of a determination by a neutral magistrate that
157. Id. at 558.
158. Id. at 560.
159. Id. at 561. This point, however, does not make much sense since Groh was the
affiant in this case and he personally presented the warrant application to the magistrate who
signed it, thereby implying that he authorized the seizure of everything in the application.
See LaFave, supra note 111, at 617-18.
160. See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
161. Groh, 540 U.S. at 563. Again, this last argument does not seem to coincide with the
Court's holding that "neither the Fourth Amendment nor Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires the executing officer to serve the warrant on the owner before
commencing the search." Id. at 562 n.5.
162. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 572-73.
164. Id. at 575 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948)) (alteration
in original).
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there is probable cause to search a particular place and to seize particular
items." 165 In this case, then, Thomas found that since "[t]he Magistrate
reviewed all of the documents and signed the warrant application and made
no adjustment or correction to this application . .. the respondents here
received the protection of the Warrant Clause .... ,,166
As a result of the Groh decision, little, if anything, was settled in this area
of the law. While it appeared that the Court favored an incorporation plus
accompaniment approach, the fact that the Court did not set forth this rule
allowed the various courts of appeals to continue to adhere to their own
rules.
II. MORE OF THE SAME POST-GRoH: CIRCUITS DIFFER ON APPROACH TO
INCORPORATION AND ACCOMPANIMENT OF AFFIDAVIT
In the short time since the Supreme Court's ruling in Groh, only some of
the circuits have ruled on this issue. 167 However, since the decision did not
set forth a bright-line rule, or at the very least require something more than
mere language of incorporation, the circuits have once again espoused
different standards when faced with the warrant/supporting document issue.
Part II.A analyzes those circuits that have taken up the issue since Groh and
followed the majority's opinion, which would require something more than
just incorporation. Part II.B discusses the circuits that read Groh in a very
narrow way-interpreting it as more advisory than mandatory-and as a
result have continued to analyze this issue using their pre-Groh standards.
A. Courts Following Groh: Incorporation and Accompaniment
This section analyzes recent decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for
the Third and Ninth Circuits and discusses how these cases reflect those
courts' decision to institute a stricter standard for law enforcement to
comply with the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. Part
II.A.1 looks at the Third Circuit's decision in Doe v. Groody168 and
analyzes both the majority's opinion and then-Judge Samuel Alito's dissent,
with both opinions clearly showing the different viewpoints of how the
Fourth Amendment should be read in light of the incorporation issue. Part
II.A.2 looks at the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in United States v.
Grubbs. 69
165. Id. at 575-76.
166. Id. at 576.
167. Not all of the decisions are discussed below because in some cases, e.g., United
States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 807 (8th Cir. 2006), the court quickly dismissed the issue
since the affidavit was incorporated and attached to the warrant.
168. 361 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2004).
169. No. 03-10311, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24997 (9th Cir. July 26, 2004).
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1. Third Circuit: Incorporation and Accompaniment
Less than a month after Groh, the Third Circuit ruled on the attachment
issue in Doe v. Groody.170 In Groody, Drug Enforcement Administration
officers sought to obtain a search warrant in order to search the residence of
a suspected drug dealer.' 71  The affidavit in support of the warrant
application requested permission to search his residence and car for drugs
and drug paraphernalia as well as any other occupants of the house because
"drug dealers often attempt to [hide drugs on others] when faced with
impending apprehension and may give such evidence to persons who do not
actually reside [at the premises] ... in hopes that said persons will not be
subject to search when police arrive." 172 However, on the actual warrant, in
the area reserved for places and/or persons to be searched, "the attached
typed affidavit was not mentioned."' 173 When officers executed the warrant,
Doe was not present at the premises; however, his wife and ten-year-old
daughter were present, so officers searched them both. 174 Doe brought this
action against Groody pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an illegal strip
search. 1 7 5
In this case, the majority reasoned that "to take advantage [of reading the
affidavit with the warrant], the warrant must expressly incorporate the
affidavit."' 76 Furthermore, the court held that the affidavit must accompany
the warrant. 177 Although this ruling seemed to imply that the court favored
a bright-line rule, the court specified two categories where an
unincorporated affidavit could save a defective warrant: 1) where there has
been a clerical error, and 2) where the affidavit modifies an otherwise
overbroad warrant.' 78 In this case, though, the court read the affidavit to
expand the face of the warrant because it called for the search of anyone
else on the premises. 179 The warrant, not the affidavit, gives the officers the
authority to search; therefore, the court found that it could not save an
170. 361 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2004). This case became much more famous as a result of
Justice Samuel Alito's dissent and his subsequent nomination to the Supreme Court. See
infra note 191.
171. Id. at 235.
172. Id. at 236.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 236-37. Both Jane and Mary Doe were subjected to a strip and full cavity
search. Id.
175. Id. at 237.
176. Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 240-41. Here, the court cites United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1116-17
(2d Cir. 1993), and explains this exception to mean that, so long as the officers know the
limits of the search, as outlined in the affidavit, the search would be valid. In the present
case, the affidavit actually broadened the search as compared to the face of the warrant since
the affidavit called for the search of anyone on the premises. The court also recognized the
fact that warrants are prepared in a hasty fashion, but held that "without a clear reference to
the affidavit in the warrant, the [affidavit] cannot simply be assumed to broaden the
[warrant]. Otherwise, we might indeed transform the judicial officer into little more than the
clichd 'rubber stamp."' Id. at 243.
179. Id. at 241.
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overbroad search if the police "exceed the full measure of the
warrant" because "it is one thing if officers use less than the authority
erroneously granted by a judge. It is quite another if officers go beyond the
authority granted by the judge."'180 Allowing the officers to use the
affidavit to expand the search would allow the exception to swallow the
rule and displace the role that the neutral magistrate plays in the warrant
process. 181
In a strongly worded dissent, Alito wrote that under the reasoning in
Ventresca,18 2 warrants must be read in a commonsense and non-legalistic
fashion because they are not drafted by attorneys.' 8 3 Alito focused on the
fact that the warrant and affidavit were both presented to the magistrate who
"carefully reviewed [the] documents and signed the warrant without
alteration." 184 Alito reasoned that since the magistrate saw both documents
and signed the warrant, he intended, therefore, to authorize the search of
everyone on the premises.'8 5  In terms of incorporation and
accompaniment, Alito found that the affidavit was "indisputably
incorporated . . . with respect to the issue of probable cause .... 1 8 6
Consequently, Alito came to the conclusion that since the magistrate saw
both documents and made no changes, the officers would be justified in
believing that they were authorized to search all occupants on the
premises. 187
Alito also attacked the majority's holding because the affidavit was
cross-referenced in another place on the warrant-the box concerning
probable cause-but was not mentioned in the area labeled persons and
places to be searched.' 88 Alito criticized the majority's holding as reading
"the warrant ... almost as if it were a contract subject to the doctrine of
contra proferentum."' 89 This reading ran contrary to the Supreme Court's
decision in Groh, which Alito understood to be that the appropriate words
of incorporation should be "judged by the 'commonsense and realistic'
standard that is generally to be used in interpreting warrants." 190 Justice
Alito's dissent in Groody became a point of contention during his Senate
confirmation hearing. 191
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
183. Groody, 361 F.3d at 245 (Alito, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 246.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 247. The officers testified that they ran out of room on the warrant, and this is
why they did not use language of incorporation on the face of the warrant. Id. at 246 n. 11.
189. Id. at 248.
190. Id.
191. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006). In the hearing, Alito was questioned about his dissent by
Senator Patrick Leahy. In defending his opinion, Alito stated that the magistrate who was
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2. Ninth Circuit: Incorporation, Accompaniment, and Presentation
In United States v. Grubbs,19 2 the Ninth Circuit reiterated its previous
position-a position it stated has "long been in accord with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Groh"-that a facially insufficient search warrant
could be cured by an affidavit only if: (1) the affidavit is incorporated into
the search warrant, and (2) the affidavit accompanies the warrant. 193 The
court went on further to define "accompany" to mean that the affidavit must
be presented at the time of the search "in order to limit officers' discretion
in conducting the search, but also in order to 'inform the person subject to
the search what items the officers executing the warrant can seize.' ' 194
This standard is effectively an incorporation plus attachment requirement
on the officers executing the search warrant.
This last point-assuring the individual of the limits of the search-has
been referenced in other cases before the Supreme Court. 195 This line of
reasoning appears to add another view on that purpose of search warrants:
not only are they supposed to show that a neutral magistrate has reviewed
the warrant and supporting documents as well as limit the scope of the
executing officers' discretion, but, as these cases point out, the warrant is
also supposed to provide assurances to the searchee of the limits of the
search. The Supreme Court in Groh referenced this line of reasoning
stating that "[a] particular warrant also 'assures the individual whose
property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing
presented the warrant acknowledged that the affidavit was incorporated for the purpose of
probable cause. Id. at 332. Furthermore, since warrants are prepared under time pressure,
they should be read in a commonsense fashion. Id. Consequently, Alito reasoned that the
magistrate authorized the officers to conduct the search on the premises, and, as a result, the
search was permissible. Therefore, the officers should not have been able to be sued for
damages "if a reasonable officer could have believed that [the search was] what the
magistrate intended to authorize." Id.
192. No. 03-10311, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24997 (9th Cir. July 26, 2004).
193. Id. at "14-15.
194. Id. (quoting United States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting
United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1355 (9th Cir. 1986))) (emphasis omitted).
195. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1989) ("An
essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens
subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of
government agents. A warrant assures the citizen that the intrusion is authorized by law, and
that it is narrowly limited in its objectives and scope."); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236
(1983) ("[Tlhe possession of a warrant by the officers conducting an arrest or search greatly
reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by assuring 'the individual
whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need
to search, and the limits of his power to search."' (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 9 (1977))); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967) ("The practical
effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the
field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently
circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search .... We
simply cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in
this context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review,
particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.").
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officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search." ' 196
However, the Court, in a footnote, acknowledged the fact that
[i]t is true . . . that neither the Fourth Amendment nor Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the executing officer to
serve the warrant on the owner before commencing the search. Rule
41(0(3) provides that "[t]he officer executing the warrant must: (A) give
a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person
from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken; or (B) leave
a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place where the officer took the
property."... Whether it would be unreasonable to refuse a request to
furnish the warrant at the outset of the search when, as in this case, an
occupant of the premises is present and poses no threat to the officers'
safe and effective performance of their mission, is a question that this case
does not present. 
19 7
Therefore, if, as the Court suggested, it is permissible for an agent to
leave a copy of the warrant after the search has been conducted, then it does
not follow that one of the purposes of the warrant requirement is to give a
searchee an opportunity ex ante to review the search warrant.
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit's reasoning that the warrant is supposed to
inform the searchee of what is to be taken before the search is conducted
does not hold since the officers can conduct the search and leave the
warrant as they are departing the premises. However, in Groh, since
Ramirez did not request to see the warrant before the search was executed,
the Court did not rule on the issue.
B. Courts Distinguishing or Limiting Groh:
Either Incorporation or Accompaniment
This section looks at the recent decisions in both the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits. Although both courts read the Groh decision in the same way,
their approaches to the issue differ slightly-the Sixth Circuit decision
includes a reasonableness analysis. Part II.B. 1 discusses the Fourth
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Hurwitz.198 Part II.B.2 analyzes the
Sixth Circuit's opinion in Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents of the
Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.199
1. Fourth Circuit: Either Incorporation or Accompaniment
In United States v. Hurwitz, the defendant was overprescribing pain
medication to patients who then sold the drugs on the street.200 The
government monitored his behavior, arrested him, and obtained search
196. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (quoting Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 9).
197. Id. at 562 n.5.
198. 459 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2006).
199. 452 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2006).
200. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 466.
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warrants for his home and medical office. 201 The government agents, in
support of the warrant application, submitted an affidavit that "provided
details about the investigation of Hurwitz, including evidence obtained with
the assistance of five of Hurwitz's patients. ' 202 In the space reserved for
persons or property to be seized, the agent wrote "See Attachment A of
Affidavit" which "listed specific items the government sought permission to
seize ... ."203 The magistrate approved the warrant and granted the
government's request to seal the warrant application and affidavit because
"revealing the material sought to be sealed would jeopardize an ongoing
criminal investigation. ,,204 Hurwitz challenged the validity of the
warrant since the warrant itself did not particularly describe the items to be
seized and because the affidavit did not accompany the warrant.20 5
The Fourth Circuit rejected Hurwitz's challenge, which was grounded in
Hurwitz's belief that Groh instituted a "definitive two-part rule for
validating a warrant by incorporation of a separate document"--that is, the
warrant must incorporate the affidavit and the affidavit must accompany the
warrant. 20 6 Instead, the Fourth Circuit read Groh more narrowly. It held
Groh, however, establishes no such rule. Instead, Groh simply
acknowledges the approach generally followed by the Courts of Appeals.
Because neither requirement was satisfied in Groh, the Supreme Court
declined to further consider the question of incorporation by reference.
("But in this case the warrant did not incorporate other documents by
reference, nor did either the affidavit or the application (which had been
placed under seal) accompany the warrant. Hence, we need not further
explore the matter of incorporation.") 20 7
The court then went on to hold that, in the Fourth Circuit, "it is sufficient
either for the warrant to incorporate the supporting document by reference
or for the supporting document to be attached to the warrant itself. '20 8 In
upholding the validity of the warrant despite the fact that the affidavit was
under seal, the court referred back to the Groh Court's holding that "[t]he
Fourth Amendment does not require an officer to serve a search warrant
before executing it."'209 The Fourth Circuit went on to hold that "'[t]he
201. Id. at 466-69.
202. Id. at 469.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 469 n.3.
205. Id. at 470.
206. Id. at 471.
207. Id. (citations omitted).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 472 (citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 562 n.5 (2004)); see Mazuz v.
Maryland, 442 F.3d 217, 229 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is not
violated if the officer executing the search warrant fails to carry the warrant during the
search); see also United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 403 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment is not violated if the officer executing a search warrant does not
leave a copy of the warrant with the property owner after the search is completed). But see
Simons, 206 F.3d at 403 (stating that failure to leave a copy of the warrant may violate Rule
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Constitution protects property owners . . . by interposing, ex ante, the
deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer' and 'by providing, ex
post, a right to suppress evidence improperly obtained."'' 2 10 Therefore, the
court reasoned that since (1) a neutral magistrate reviewed and approved the
warrant, and (2) Hurwitz had a right to challenge both the validity of the
warrant and the seizure of items after the search, his Fourth Amendment
right was not violated by the agents' search.
2. Sixth Circuit: Incorporation (and Preference for Accompaniment)
In Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms,2 11 federal agents searched the warehouse of the
plaintiff, who was suspected of selling illegal firearms. 2 12 The agents
applied for a search warrant, and, in the supporting affidavit, explained
plaintiffs system for selling the weapons and identified the warehouse to be
searched and the guns to be seized. 2 13 The warrant, however, did not list
this information, but instead, in the area marked for description of persons
or places to be searched, it said "See Attached Affidavit. ' ' 2 14  The
magistrate signed both the affidavit and the search warrant and then sealed
the affidavit to protect the government's confidential sources.2 15 When
executing the search, agents encountered one of the plaintiffs attorneys,
who asked to see the affidavit and complained that the search was illegal
since the warrant did not particularly describe the places and things to be
seized. 2 16 Thereafter, plaintiff initiated an action seeking damages due to
the claimed illegal search.2 17
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the finding in Groh that a warrant
application does not necessarily save a warrant; however, the Sixth Circuit
found that the reason the warrant was "doomed" in Groh was not the fact
that the affidavit was not present, rather it was the fact that the affidavit was
not cross-referenced at all.2 18 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit found no
doubt "whether the Magistrate was aware of the scope of the search he was
authorizing" because he signed both documents-the warrant and
affidavit. 2 19
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure depending on whether the officer intended to
violate the rule).
210. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d at 472 (quoting United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 99 (2006)).
211. 452 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2006).
212. Id. at436.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.; see supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
216. Baranski, 452 F.3d at 436-37.
217. Id. at 437. As in Groh, Keith Baranski sued under Bivens for money damages. Id. at
436.
218. Id. at 439.
219. Id. at440.
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The Sixth Circuit took a different approach than the Fourth Circuit to
analyze whether or not the officers needed to have the affidavit accompany
the warrant during the search. The Sixth Circuit held that
officers generally should bring an incorporated affidavit (or an
authenticated summary of the items to be seized) with them during the
search and that the failure to do so may be a factor in determining
whether the search was reasonable .... If, say, a search involved
otherwise fungible property that contained discrete identifying
markers.., and if only an incorporated affidavit described those markers,
the absence of the affidavit on the scene could render the search
unreasonable. But that does not establish that the absence of an
incorporated affidavit during a search makes the search a presumptively
unreasonable one in all settings, no matter whether the property owner
was there, no matter how readily identifiable the subject of the search.
The salient point is that Groh did not establish a one-size-fits-all
requirement that affidavits must accompany all searches to prevent a
lawfully authorized search from becoming a warrantless one.220
The court, then, did not require the "incorporate and accompany rule"
that other circuits read Groh to mandate. 221 Instead, the accompaniment of
an affidavit will make a search more reasonable, but the absence of the
affidavit does not make the search automatically per se unreasonable. 22 2
In sum, the Sixth Circuit differentiates the issuance of the warrant from
the execution of the warrant. So long as the government had a warrant that
set forth probable cause, supported by an affidavit, particularly describing
the places searched and persons/things to be seized, and this warrant, along
with supporting documents, was approved by a neutral magistrate, then the
issuance of the warrant was valid. 223 The execution of the warrant cannot
invalidate this issuance. 224 However, a warrant that "satisfies the Warrant
Clause upon issuance ... by no means establishes that a search satisfies the
Reasonableness Clause upon execution .... 225  So, a warrant that is
approved by a neutral magistrate satisfies the warrant requirement, but the
execution of the warrant, if conducted outside the parameters approved by
the magistrate, could render the search to be unreasonable and in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
III. BACK TO BASICS: RESPECT FOR THE NEUTRAL MAGISTRATE
This Note has covered various holdings and rationales espoused by
different courts when faced with the supporting documents issue. The
conflict, however, results from two different theories regarding Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. The courts that require incorporation and
220. Id. at 444 (citation omitted).
221. See supra notes 170-97 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
223. Baranski, 452 F.3d at 440-41.
224. Id. at 441.
225. Id. at 445.
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attachment/accompaniment are of the belief that the main protection of the
Fourth Amendment is the warrant itself, a warrant that clearly and expressly
limits the confines of the search. The courts on the other side of the
conflict, the courts that do not require such rigidity in the preparation,
issuance, and execution of the warrant, are of the belief that the principal
protection of the Fourth Amendment is not the warrant itself, but rather, the
objective review by a neutral magistrate ensuring that the search is
supported by probable cause and sufficiently limited. This Note advocates
that the incorporation of supporting documents issue should be decided in
light of the actions taken by the neutral magistrate, and therefore agrees
with the recent decisions in both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.226
A. And No Warrants Shall Issue
The Fourth Amendment was drafted in order to protect citizens from the
oppressive use of general warrants.227 As Justice Thomas noted in his
dissent in Groh, the protection against this general warrant was not the
warrant itself, but rather the neutral oversight by a judicial magistrate. 228
The neutral magistrate must review the warrant application and any
supporting documents before authorizing a warrant.229 Consequently, if a
magistrate does not believe that probable cause exists to conduct a search,
or believes that the description of the place to be searched or items to be
seized is overly broad, then he or she would presumably not approve the
warrant and would require the officer to narrow the parameters of the
search. This was the exact reasoning behind both the Fourth and Sixth
Circuit decisions. 230
Although the Supreme Court in Groh preferred that the affidavit
accompany the warrant, it made clear that the warrant did not have to be
presented to the searchee prior to the commencement of the search. 231 The
Fourth Circuit furthered this argument when it held in Hurwitz that officers
did not have to serve the warrant before searching, and furthermore the
searchee's protections against an overly broad search were (1) the impartial
judgment of a magistrate, and (2) the right to suppress illegally obtained
evidence after the search had been conducted. 232 Therefore, if the warrant
does not have to be served before the execution of the warrant, then it
certainly cannot be considered the fundamental protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Rather, the principal protection is the fact that a neutral
observer has authorized the search, ensuring that a "general warrant" has
not been issued. 233
226. See supra Part II.B.
227. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
228. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 575-76 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
229. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 206-25 and accompanying text.
231. Groh, 540 U.S. at 562 n.5.
232. United States v. Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 472 (4th Cir. 2006).
233. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the strict rule of incorporation and accompaniment/attachment
runs counter to the widely held rule that search warrants be read in a
commonsense and realistic fashion because they are not written by lawyers,
but by officers who, more often than not, are attempting to procure a
warrant quickly in order to seize evidence before it disappears. 234
Therefore, so long as the supporting document is referenced somewhere in
the warrant, and both the warrant and supporting document have been
reviewed by a neutral magistrate, there should be no reason why the warrant
would fail for lack of particularity in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Furthermore, even if for some reason a warrant were found to be facially
invalid due to a failure to fully incorporate a supporting document by
suitable words of reference, a search should not be found to be
unconstitutional if the magistrate has reviewed and approved both
documents. 235 In such a case, an officer would be able to invoke the good
faith exception permitted in United States v. Leon.236 In this scenario, an
officer would have a good faith belief that the warrant was facially valid
since a neutral magistrate would have approved both the warrant and any
supporting documents that would further define the scope of the search.
B. More Backup for Law Enforcement?
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Groh, two Justices have been
added to the Supreme Court. Groh was a 5-4 decision with Justices Sandra
Day O'Connor, John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer,
and David Souter in the majority. Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, Anthony Kennedy, and Chief Justice William Rehnquist
dissented.237 Should this issue come before the Supreme Court in the
future, there is a strong possibility that the Court may hold that mere
incorporation is all that is needed to satisfy the particularity requirement.
As discussed above, both Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented in the Groh
decision, finding that so long as the magistrate reviewed the warrant and
affidavit, the search was valid.238  Furthermore, Justice Alito strongly
dissented in Groody, also finding that incorporation was enough so long as
the warrant was reviewed by a neutral magistrate. 239 Chief Justice John
Roberts has yet to address this issue. However, in the ten Fourth
Amendment cases that he heard during his time on the D.C. Circuit, Roberts
sided with law enforcement in every case.240 Therefore, it seems likely that
234. See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
237. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 566 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Anthony Kennedy, however, found the search warrant to be facially deficient and therefore
found the search to be warrantless. Kennedy dissented on the issue of whether or not Groh
would be protected by qualified immunity. Id. at 571.
238. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
240. See United States v. Jackson, 415 F.3d 88, 101-06 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Lawson, 410 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v.
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the deciding vote on this issue would come from Justice Kennedy. While a
judge on the Ninth Circuit, Kennedy authored two opinions that dealt with
the supporting documents issue. 241 In both decisions, Kennedy found that,
for the supporting documents to be read in addition to the search warrant,
the documents must accompany the warrant, and the warrant must use
"suitable words of reference which incorporate the affidavit therein." 242
However, in the later decision, Kennedy appeared to possibly allow an
affidavit to cure the warrant if the affidavit was sufficiently particular so as
to guide the officers conducting the search. 243 Therefore, it is probable that,
if this issue were to present itself again to the Supreme Court, the outcome
would be similar to that of Groh, and the view that the issuance of a
particularized search warrant is the principal protection of the Fourth
Amendment would prevail.
CONCLUSION
In a post-9/1 I United States, there could be many opportunities for
searches to be conducted pursuant to warrants supported by sealed
affidavits due to national security concerns. When determining whether the
search violated a person's Fourth Amendment's right, courts should not
apply highly technical tests that focus on whether the affidavit was
sufficiently attached or if it accompanied the warrant. Rather, courts should
honor the original intent of the Fourth Amendment and find that, so long as
a neutral magistrate reviewed all of the documents and approved the
warrant, the searchee's Fourth Amendment right has been protected, and if,
for some reason the officers do not adhere to the parameters of the search,
then the searchee has the ex-post remedy of suppressing the evidence.
Moore, 394 F.3d 925 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hedgepeth v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 386
F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Holmes, 385 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United
States v. Brown, 374 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Int'l Action Ctr. v. United States, 365 F.3d
20 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Reid, 89 F. App'x 279 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also
United States v. Riley, 351 F.3d 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Stewart v. Evans, 351 F.3d 1239
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
241. See United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1982).
242. Hillyard, 677 F.2d at 1340.
243. Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 967.
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